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Economists are reconciled to theconßict of absolutes: that is whythey invented the concept of trade-
oÝs. It should not surprise them, there-
fore, that the objective of environmen-
tal protection should at times run afoul
of the goal of seeking maximum gains
from trade. In fact, economists would be
suspicious of any claims, such as those
made by soothsaying politicians, that
both causes would be only mutually
beneÞcial. They are rightly disconcerted,
however, by the passion and the feroci-
ty, and hence often the lack of logic or
facts, with which environmental groups
have recently assailed both free trade
and the General Agreement on TariÝs
and Trade (GATT), the institution that
oversees the world trading system.
The environmentalistsÕ antipathy to
trade is perhaps inevitable. Trade has
been central to economic thinking since
Adam Smith discovered the virtues of
specialization and of the markets that
naturally sustain it. Because markets do
not normally exist for the pursuit of en-
vironmental protection, they must be
specially created. Trade therefore sug-
gests abstention from governmental in-
tervention, whereas environmentalism
suggests its necessity. Then again, trade
is exploited and its virtues extolled by
corporate and multinational interests,
whereas environmental objectives are
embraced typically by nonproÞt orga-
nizations, which are generally wary of
these interests. Trade is an ancient occu-
pation, and its nurture is the objective
of institutions crafted over many years
of experience and reßection. Protection
of the environment, on the other hand,
is a recent preoccupation of national
and international institutions that are
nascent and still evolving.
Last year the environmentalistsÕ hos-
tility to trade exploded in outrage when
an impartial GATT Dispute Settlement
Panel ruled in favor of Mexico and free
trade and against the U.S. and the wel-
fare of the dolphin. The U.S. had placed
an embargo on the import of Mexican
tuna on the grounds that the Þsh had
been caught in purse-seine nets, which
kill dolphins cruelly and in greater num-
bers than U.S. law permits. The GATT
panel ruled, in eÝect, that the U.S. could
not suspend MexicoÕs trading rights by
proscribing unilaterally the methods by
which that country harvested tuna.
This decision spurred the conserva-
tionistsÕ subsequent campaigns against
free trade and GATT. GATT has no
shortage of detractors, of course. In fact,
some of its recent critics have feared 
its impotence and declared it Òdead,Ó re-
ferring to it as the General Agreement to
Talk and Talk. But the environmentalist
attacks, which presume instead GATTÕs
omnipotence, are something else again.
An advertisement by a coalition of
environmental groups in the New York
Times on April 20, 1992, set a new stan-
dard for alarmist, even scurrilous, writ-
ing, calculated to appeal to oneÕs in-
stincts rather than oneÕs intellect. It talks
of Òfaceless GATT bureaucratsÓ mount-
ing a Òsneak attack on democracy.Ó This
veiled reference to Pearl Harbor pro-
vides an example of a common tactic in
trade controversy: Japan-bashing. The
innuendos have continued unabated
and are manifest in the endless battles
in Congress over the supplemental envi-
ronmental accords for the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The hostility is also intruding on the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of
GATT talks, now in their seventh year,
with the environmentalists opposing the
establishment of the new Multilateral
Trade Organization, which is meant to
provide eÝective discipline and a nec-
essary institutional structure for GATT.
It is surely tragic that the proponents
of two of the great causes of the 1990s,
trade and the environment, should be
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locked in combat. The conßict is large-
ly gratuitous. There are at times philo-
sophical diÝerences between the two
that cannot be reconciled, as when some
environmentalists assert natureÕs au-
tonomy, whereas most economists see
nature as a handmaiden to humankind.
For the most part, however, the diÝer-
ences derive from misconceptions. It is
necessary to dissect and dismiss the
more egregious of these fallacies be-
fore addressing the genuine problems.
The fear is widespread among envi-
ronmentalists that free trade increases
economic growth and that growth harms
the environment. That fear is misplaced.
Growth enables governments to tax and
to raise resources for a variety of objec-
tives, including the abatement of pollu-
tion and the general protection of the
environment. Without such revenues, lit-
tle can be achieved, no matter how pure
oneÕs motives may be.
How do societies actually spend these
additional revenues? It depends on how
getting rich aÝects the desire for a bet-
ter environment. Rich countries today
have more groups worrying about en-
vironmental causes than do poor coun-
tries. EÛcient policies, such as freer
trade, should generally help environ-
mentalism, not harm it.
If one wants to predict what growth
will do to the environment, however,
one must also consider how it will aÝect
the production of pollution. Growth af-
fects not only the demand for a good
environment but also the supply of the
pollution associated with growth. The
net eÝect on the environment will there-
fore depend on the kind of economic
growth. Gene M. Grossman and Alan B.
Krueger of Princeton University found
that in cities around the world sulfur di-
oxide pollution fell as per capita income
rose. The only exception was in coun-
tries whose per capita incomes fell be-
low $5,000. In short, environmentalists
are in error when they fear that trade,
through growth, will necessarily increase
pollution.
Economic eÝects besides those attri-
butable to rising incomes also help to
protect the environment. For example,
freer trade enables pollution-Þghting
technologies available elsewhere to be
imported. Thus, trade in low-sulfur-con-
tent coal will enable the users of local
high-sulfur-content coal to shift from
the latter to the former.
Free trade can also lead to betterenvironmental outcomes from ashift in the composition of pro-
duction. An excellent example is provid-
ed by Robert C. Feenstra of the Universi-
ty of California at Davis. He has shown
how the imposition of restraints on Jap-
anese automobile exports to the U.S.
during the 1980s shifted the compo-
sition of those exports from small to
large cars, as the Japanese attempted
to increase their revenues without in-
creasing the number of units they sold.
Yet the large cars were fuel ineÛcient.
Thus, protective eÝorts by the U.S. ef-
fectively increased the average amount
of pollution produced by imported cars,
making it more likely that pollution
from cars would increase rather than
diminish in the U.S.
Although these erroneous objections
to free trade are readily dismissed (but
not so easily eliminated from public dis-
course), there are genuine conßicts be-
tween trade and the environment. To
understand and solve them, economists
draw a distinction between two kinds
of environmental problems: those that
are intrinsically domestic and those that
are intrinsically transnational.
Should Brazil pollute a lake lying whol-
ly within its borders, the problem would
be intrinsically domestic. Should it pol-
lute a river that ßows into Argentina,
the matter would take on an intrinsi-
cally transnational character. Perhaps
the most important examples of trans-
national pollution are acid rain, created
when sulfur dioxide emissions in one
country precipitate into rain in anoth-
er, and greenhouse gases, such as car-
bon dioxide, which contribute to global
warming wherever they are emitted.
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ensnared oÝ the U.S. Atlantic coast. But when the U.S. attempted to apply its stan-
dard to Mexico by imposing an embargo on tuna imported from that country, an
international tribunal rejected the policy last year as an illegal restriction of trade.
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Why do intrinsically domestic envi-
ronmental questions create internation-
al concern? The main reason is the belief
that diversity in environmental stan-
dards may aÝect competitiveness. Busi-
nesses and labor unions worry that their
rivals in other countries may gain an
edge if their governments impose lower
standards of environmental protection.
They decry such diÝerences as unfair.
To level the playing Þeld, these lob-
bies insist that foreign countries raise
their standards up to domestic ones. In
turn, environmental groups worry that
if such Òharmonization upÓ is not un-
dertaken prior to freeing trade, pres-
sures from uncompetitive businesses
at home will force down domestic stan-
dards, reversing their hard-won victor-
ies. Finally, there is the fear, drama-
tized by H. Ross Perot in his criticisms
of NAFTA, that factories will relocate
to the countries whose environmental
standards are lowest.
But if the competitiveness issue makes
the environmentalists, the businesses
and the unions into allies, the environ-
mentalists are on their own in other
ways. Two problem areas can be distin-
guished. First, some environmentalists
are keen to impose their own ethical
preferences on others, using trade sanc-
tions to induce or coerce acceptance 
of such preferences. For instance, tuna
Þshing with purse-seine nets that kill
dolphins is opposed by U.S. environmen-
tal groups, which consequently favor
restraints on the importation of such
tuna from Mexico and elsewhere. Sec-
ond, other environmentalists fear that
the rules of free trade, as embodied in
GATT and strengthened in the Uruguay
Round, will constrain their freedom to
pursue even purely domestic environ-
mental objectives, with GATT tribunals
outlawing disputed regulation.
Environmentalists have cause forconcern. Not all concerns are le-gitimate, however, and not all the
solutions to legitimate concerns are sen-
sible. Worry over competitiveness has
thus led to the illegitimate demand 
that environmental standards abroad be
treated as Òsocial dumping.Ó OÝending
countries are regarded as unfairly sub-
sidizing their exporters through lax en-
vironmental requirements. Such implic-
it subsidies, the reasoning continues,
ought to be oÝset by import duties.
Yet international diÝerences in envi-
ronmental standards are perfectly nat-
ural. Even if two countries share the
same environmental objectives, the spe-
ciÞc pollutions they would attack, and
hence the industries they would hin-
der, will generally not be identical. Mex-
ico has a greater social incentive than
does the U.S. to spend an extra dollar
preventing dysentery rather than re-
ducing lead in gasoline.
Equally, a certain environmental good
might be valued more highly by a poor
country than by a rich one. Contrast, for
instance, the value assigned to a lake
with the cost of cleaning up eÜuents
discharged into it by a pharmaceutical
company. In India such a lakeÕs water
might be drunk by a malnourished pop-
ulation whose mortality would increase
sharply with the rise in pollution. In the
U.S. the water might be consumed by
few people, all of whom have the means
to protect themselves with privately pur-
chased water Þlters. In this example,
India would be the more likely to pre-
fer clean water to the pharmaceutical
companyÕs proÞts.
The consequences of diÝering stan-
dards are clear : each country will have
less of the industry whose pollution it
fears relatively more than other coun-
tries do. Indeed, even if there were no
international trade, we would be shrink-
ing industries whose pollution we de-
ter. This result follows from the policy
of forcing polluters of all stripes to pay
for the harm they cause. To object, then,
to the eÝects our negative valuation of
pollution have on a given industry is to
be in contradiction: we would be refus-
ing to face the consequences of our en-
vironmental preferences.
Nevertheless, there is sentiment for
enacting legislation against social dump-
ing. Senator Davil L. Boren of Oklaho-
ma, the proponent of the International
Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991, de-
manded import duties on the grounds
that Òsome U.S. manufacturers, such as
the U.S. carbon and steel alloy industry,
spend as much as 250 percent more on
environmental controls as a percentage
of gross domestic product than do oth-
er countries. . . . I see the unfair advan-
tage enjoyed by other nations exploit-
ing the environment and public health
for economic gain when I look at many
industries important to my own state.Ó
Similarly, Vice President Al Gore wrote
in Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the
Human Spirit that Òjust as government
subsidies of a particular industry are
sometimes considered unfair under the
trade laws, weak and ineÝectual enforce-
ment of pollution control measures
should also be included in the deÞni-
tion of unfair trading practices.Ó
These demands betray lack of eco-
nomic logic, and they ignore political
reality as well. Remember that the so-
called subsidy to foreign producers
through lower standards is not given
but only implied. According to Senator
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PERVERSE CONSEQUENCES for the environment may result from trade restrictions.
This graph shows Japanese car exports to the U.S. before and after JapanÕs acqui-
escence in voluntary export restraints. Sales of small , fuel-eÛcient models declined,
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Boren, the subsidy would be calculated
as Òthe cost that would have to be in-
curred by the manufacturer or produc-
er of the foreign articles of merchandise
to comply with environmental standards
imposed on U.S. producers of the same
class of merchandise.Ó Anyone familiar
with the way dumping calculations are
made knows that the Environmental
Protection Agency could come up with
virtually any estimates it cared to pro-
duce. Cynical politics would inevitably
dictate the calculations.
Still, there may be political goodsense in assuaging environmen-talistsÕ concerns about the relo-
cation of factories to countries with
lower standards. The governments of
higher-standards countries could do 
so without encumbering free trade by
insisting that their businesses accede
to the higher standards when they go
abroad. Such a policy lies entirely with-
in the jurisdictional powers of a higher-
standards country. Moreover, the gov-
ernments of lower-standards countries
would be most unlikely to object to
such an act of good citizenship by the
foreign investors.
Environmentalists oppose free trade
for yet another reason: they wish to use
trade policy to impose their values on
other communities and countries. Many
environmentalists want to suspend the
trading rights of countries that sanc-
tion the use of purse-seine nets in tuna
Þshing and of leg-hold traps in trap-
ping. Such punishments seem an in-
appropriate use of state power, howev-
er. The values in question are not wide-
ly accepted, such as human rights, but
idiosyncratic. One wonders when the
opponents of purse-seine nets put the
interests of the dolphin ahead of those
of MexicoÕs people, who could prosper
through more productive Þshing. To
borrow the campaign manifesto of Pres-
ident Bill Clinton: Should we not put
people Þrst?
Moreover, once such values intrude
on free trade, the way is opened for 
an endless succession of demands. En-
vironmentalists favor dolphins; Indi-
ans have their sacred cows. Animal-
rights activists, who do not prefer one
species over another, will object to our
slaughterhouses.
The moral militancy of environmen-
talists in the industrialized world has
begun to disillusion their closest coun-
terparts in the undeveloped countries.
These local environmentalists accuse
the rich countries of Òeco-imperialism,Ó
and they deny that the Western nations
have a monopoly on virtue. The most
radical of todayÕs proenvironment mag-
azines in India, Down to Earth, editorial-
ized recently: ÒIn the current world re-
ality trade is used as an instrument en-
tirely by Northern countries to discipline
environmentally errant nations. Surely, if
India or Kenya were to threaten to stop
trade with the U.S., it would hardly af-
fect the latter. But the fact of the mat-
ter is that it is the Northern countries
that have the greatest [adverse] impact
on the worldÕs environment.Ó
If many countries were to play this
game, then repeated suspensions of
trading rights would begin to undermine
the openness of the trading system and
the predictability and stability of interna-
tional markets. Some environmentalists
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EMPLOYMENT IN MEXICAN TUNA FISHERY may oÝset the sav-
ing of dolphins that would result were the industry to forgo
purse-seine nets. Countries should not be faulted for placing
human welfare ahead of our culture-speciÞc concerns.
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assert that each country should be free
to insist on the production methods 
of its trading partners. Yet these envi-
ronmentalists ignore the certain con-
sequence of their policy: a PandoraÕs box
of protectionism would open up. Rare-
ly are production methods in an indus-
try identical in diÝerent countries.
There are certainly better ways to in-
dulge the environmentalistsÕ propensity
to export their ethical preferences. The
U.S. environmental organizations can
lobby in Mexico to persuade its govern-
ment to adopt their views. Private boy-
cotts can also be undertaken. In fact,
boycotts can carry much clout in rich
countries with big markets, on which
the targeted poor countries often de-
pend. The frequent and enormously ex-
pensive advertisements by environmen-
tal groups against GATT show also that
their resources far exceed those of the
cash-strapped countries whose policies
they oppose.
Cost-beneÞt analysis leads one to con-
clude that unilateral governmental sus-
pension of othersÕ trading rights is not
an appropriate way to promote oneÕs
lesser ethical preferences. Such sanc-
tions can, on the other hand, appropri-
ately be invoked multilaterally to defend
universal moral values. In such casesÑ
as in the censure of apartheid, as prac-
ticed until recently in South AfricaÑit
is possible to secure widespread agree-
ment for sanctions. With a large major-
ity converted to the cause, GATTÕs waiv-
er procedure can be used to suspend
the oÝending countryÕs trading rights.
Environmentalists are also worriedabout the obstacles that the cur-rent and prospective GATT rules
pose for environmental regulations
aimed entirely at domestic production
and consumption. In principle, GATT
lets a country enforce any regulation
that does not discriminate against or
among foreign suppliers. One can, for
example, require airbags in cars, provid-
ed that the rule applies to all automo-
bile makers. GATT even permits rules
that discriminate against trade for the
purpose of safety and health.
GATT, however, recognizes three
ways in which regulations may be set
in gratuitous restraint of trade; in fol-
lowing procedures aimed at avoiding
such outcomes, GATT upsets the envi-
ronmentalists. First, the true intentionÑ
and eÝectÑof a regulation may be to
protect not the environment but local
business. Second, a country may im-
pose more restrictions than necessary
to achieve its stated environmental ob-
jective. Third, it may set standards that
have no scientiÞc basis.
The issue of intentions is illustrated
by the recently settled Òbeer warÓ be-
tween Ontario and the U.S. Five years
ago the Canadian province imposed a
10-cents-a-can tax on beer, ostensibly
to discourage littering. The U.S. argued
that the law in fact intended to discrim-
inate against its beer suppliers, who
used aluminum cans, whereas local beer
companies used bottles. Ontario had
omitted to tax the use of cans for juic-
es and soups, a step that would have
aÝected Ontario producers.
The second problem is generally
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PURE DRINKING WATER is essential for Mexican villagers,
who wait in line to collect it rather than risk contracting chol-
era from local sources. The relative value of environmental
beneÞts varies in diÝerent countries: Mexico can better im-
prove public health by concentrating its resources on the puri-
Þcation of water than by reducing the lead in gasoline.
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tougher because it is impossible to Þnd
alternative restrictions that accomplish
exactly the same environmental results
as the original policy at lower cost. An
adjudicating panel is then forced to eval-
uate, implicitly or explicitly, the trade-
oÝs between the cost in trade disruption
and the cost in lesser fulÞllment of the
environmental objective. It is therefore
likely that environmentalists and trade
experts will diÝer on which weights the
panel should assign to these divergent
interests.
Environmentalists tend to be fearful
about the use of scientiÞc tests to de-
termine whether trade in a product can
be proscribed. The need to prove oneÕs
case is always an unwelcome burden to
those who have the political power to
take unilateral action. Yet the trade ex-
perts have the better of the argument.
Imagine that U.S. growers sprayed ap-
ples with the pesticide Alar, whereas Eu-
ropean growers did not, and that Euro-
pean consumers began to agitate against
Alar as harmful. Should the European
Community be allowed to end the im-
portation of the U.S. apples without
meeting some scientiÞc test of its health
concerns? Admittedly, even hard science
is often not hard enoughÑdiÝerent
studies may reach diÝerent conclusions.
But without the restraining hand of sci-
ence, the itch to indulge oneÕs fearsÑ
and to play on the fears of othersÑ
would be irresistible.
In all cases, the moderate environ-
mentalists would like to see GATT adopt
more transparent procedures for adjudi-
cating disputes. They also desire great-
er legal standing to Þle briefs when envi-
ronmental regulations are at issue. These
goals seem both reasonable and feasible.
Not all environmental problemsare local ; some are truly global,such as the greenhouse eÝect
and the depletion of the stratospheric
ozone. They raise more issues that re-
quire cooperative, multilateral solutions.
Such solutions must be both eÛcient
and equitable. Still, it is easy to see that
rich countries might use their econom-
ic power to reach protocols that maxi-
mize eÛciency at the expense of poor-
er countries.
For instance, imagine that the draft-
ers of a protocol were to ask Brazil to
refrain from cutting down its rain for-
ests while allowing industrialized coun-
tries to continue emitting carbon diox-
ide. They might justify this request on
the grounds that it costs Brazil less to
keep a tree alive, absorbing a unit of
carbon dioxide every year, than it would
cost the U.S. or Germany to save a unit
by burning less oil. Such a trade-oÝ
would indeed be economically eÛcient.
Yet if Brazil, a poorer country, were then
left with the bill, the solution would as-
suredly be inequitable.
Before any group of countries impos-
es trade sanctions on a country that
has not joined a multilateral protocol,
it would be important to judge whether
the protocol is indeed fair. Nonmembers
targeted for trade sanctions should have
the right to get an impartial hearing of
their objections, requiring the strong to
defend their actions even when they ap-
pear to be entirely virtuous.
The simultaneous pursuit of the two
causes of free trade and a protected
environment often raises problems, to
be sure. But none of these conßicts is
beyond resolution with goodwill and
by imaginative institutional innovation.
The aversion to free trade and GATT
that many environmentalists display is
unfounded, and it is time for them to
shed it. Their admirable moral passion
and certain intellectual vigor are better
devoted to building bridges between the
causes of trade and the environment.
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